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ABSTRACT
The paper provides a theoretical contribution to the multi-level
governance debate, discussing the role of the policy instruments in
tailoring polities for local development strategies. To this purpose,
it examines the Community-Led Local Development (CLLD), a
policy tool of the EU Cohesion Policy 2014–2020, which has
generated more than 3000 local initiatives across the EU. An
institutionalist perspective enables a reﬂection on the multi-level
normative dimensions of these local initiatives. A combination of
the post-functionalist governance theory, the soft space debate,
state-theory and strategic-relational approach provides an
interpretative framework to be deployed for a dedicated research
agenda. The interpretative challenge is about whether the CLLD
enables spatial-temporal ﬁxes in which a deliberative polity
pursues a spatial imaginary for an ad-hoc territory. The consequent
analytical dimensions can be found in (a) the relationship between
attendant ad-hoc polity, policy agenda, territorial design and
societal processes; and (b) the meta-governance dimensions that
locate the bottom-up constituency of this institutional technology
in the shadow of state’s hierarchy. An overview of the CLLD
implementation across the EU provides evidence on the latter.
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1. Introduction
Political science, human geography, and spatial planning studies have been widely occu-
pied by the compelling question of the appropriate scale for policy action and the way
institutions can address socio-spatial dynamics through the reconﬁguration of the
decision-making arrangements. Along the last decades, the new forms of decision-
making processes and the experimental institutional arrangements among actors, both
at diﬀerent scales and beyond the public authority, have been addressed by the Multi-
Level Governance debate. A series of interpretative concepts have allowed on the one
hand a better understanding of the forms of interaction and power relations between
the state and other institutional and policy actors (Piattoni, 2009) with a shift from a cen-
tralized structure to a more articulated functioning of a Westphalian statehood (Caporaso,
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Loris Servillo loris.servillo@gmail.com Bartlett school of Planning, University College of London, London,
UK
This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
EUROPEAN PLANNING STUDIES
2019, VOL. 27, NO. 4, 678–698
https://doi.org/10.1080/09654313.2019.1569595
2000), and on the other hand, the interpretation of the EU’s role in the macro-scale gov-
ernance process with the Member States (Heritier & Rhodes, 2010).
In this frame, the necessity of going beyond the jurisdiction of public (local and
regional) authorities in addressing socio-spatial phenomena through public actions has
bourgeoned theoretical interpretations and empirical investigations of processes based
on task-speciﬁc tailored space for policy action. Together with the investigation of the
policy for which the tailored space is conceived, a broad variety of studies have underlined
the importance of other dimensions, such as (a) the relationship between spatiality and
territoriality (Faludi, 2013), and the role of space as ‘mean’ and ‘objective’ of governance
(Jessop, 2016); (b) the multi-level governance architecture of the process, and the vertical
and horizontal shift of competences and power (Hooghe &Marks, 2009); (c) the construc-
tion of new polities as policy arena (Hajer, 2003), and their institutional design; (d) the
community’s role in the process (Moulaert, MacCallum, Mehmood, & Hamdouch,
2013); and (e) the legitimacy of the socio-spatial constituency (Swyngedouw, 2005).
The paper provides a speciﬁc contribution to this variegated ﬁeld of knowledge. It uses
the EU policy instrument Community-Led Local Development (CLLD), which is one of
the novelties of the current EU programming period 2014–2020, to explore various
dimensions of the existing debate and to combine them in a thorough interpretative
approach for these socio-spatial and political phenomena.
Built on the experience of the former LEADER program, the CLLD has been conceived as a
policy tool that fosters local development through theﬁnancial support of integrated local devel-
opment strategies. It draws on a place-based approach (Barca, 2009) and strategic spatial plan-
ning (Albrechts, 2010). It requires the deﬁnition of a strategy for a functional space tailored to
speciﬁc local socio-economic characteristics,whichusually cross administrative boundaries and
whose coherence should be adequate to the local development vision. In the purpose of the
initiative, the deﬁnition of the needs and of the features of the spatial strategy should be the
outcome of a thorough involvement of the local actors in the decision making process, in part-
nership with local enterprises, public authorities and community representatives. These actors
then should form a Local Action Group (LAG), a dedicated entity that is in charge of the strat-
egy, the budgetmanagement, the implementationprocess throughprojects, and themonitoring
activity. The compositionof theLAGshould ensure that thedecisionmakingpower is not taken
by a dominant actor, but rather it is shared among the wide range of partners.
The use of CLLD in the national or regional agendas is largely voluntary and depends on
several factors, among which: the expenditure modalities of the European Structural and
Investment Funds (ESIF); the intended spatial development agenda at various levels; and
the local actors’ mobilization and their proactive capacity. We can expect several interpret-
ations, with a diﬀerent application of the various ﬁnancial options and their codiﬁcation in
local practices that will generate a kaleidoscope of local initiatives, themes and approaches.
As it will be shown in this paper, the CLLD has reached the impressive number of more
than 3000 initiatives across the EU. The CLLD implementation represents therefore a stimu-
lating research subject, which will generate presumably several research agendas, both at
national and cross-country level, with the aim of verifying the eﬀectiveness of this approach
and exploring its characteristics and added value from diﬀerent perspectives, as well as high-
lighting bottlenecks, contradictions and missed opportunities.
In this context, the paper has the ambition to provide a frame for the multiple research
agendas that can address these initiatives, moving beyond the policy evaluation and
EUROPEAN PLANNING STUDIES 679
investigating the generated governance dynamics. The scheme here below reports the
research questions associated to two dimensions: the ‘how’, in which the scientiﬁc debate
is explored in search of conceptual tools to address what is at stake; and the ‘what’ about
the necessity to contextualize the instrument in the EU policy and clarify its novelty and
the variety of approaches that can take place at the local level in order to validate the inter-
pretative scheme.
Research question Method Working hypothesis
How • How can the normative framework
that characterize the enabled local
initiatives be conceptualised?
• What are the analytical
dimensions of the activated multi-
level governance process?
• Theoretical interpretative frame
based on Multilevel Governance and
post-functionalist governance
theory, soft-planning debate, State-
theory and SRA approach
• Theoretical validation through the
ﬁndings about CLLD
implementation
• Spatial–temporal ﬁx that relies on
a generated socio-institutional
process to pursuing a spatial
imaginary
• Crucial role of meta-
governance that frames bottom-
up initiatives in the shadow of
hierarchy
What • What are the technical features of
the CLLD?
• What is the current state of
implementation across the EU,
and the national and regional
diﬀerentiation?
• How do the various
interpretations aﬀect the local
implementation?
• Policy document analysis
• Inquiry about the CLLD
implementation by the National/
Regional Managing Authorities of
the EU Funds across the EU
• Survey about those LAGs exploiting
the new ﬁnancial possibilities
• Among the most innovative
place-based instruments ‘on
paper’
• Limited success of the ﬁnancial
innovation in comparison to
LEADER
• Crucial role of national and
regional interpretations in
framing the local actions
An institutionalist perspective (Gualini, 2004; Salet, 2018) drives the exploration of the
variegated debate on Multi-Level Governance and highlights the normative frame of the
governance process enabled by the CLLD. The interpretative challenge is about whether
the CLLD enables spatial–temporal ﬁxes in which a deliberative polity pursues a spatial
imaginary for an ad-hoc territory. The consequent analytical dimensions can be found
in: (a) the relationship between attendant ad-hoc polity, policy agenda, territorial design
and societal processes; and (b) in the meta-governance dimensions that locate the
bottom-up constituency of this institutional technology in the shadow of state’s hierarchy.
In order to expose it, the paper in its Part 1 builds up a theoretical framework, reﬂecting on
the institutional technology that enables task-speciﬁc jurisdictions in charge of a local devel-
opment strategy for a tailored territory. An interpretative scheme is presented and discussed.
Part 2 describes how the CLLD is an initiative that is rooted in an EUpolicy context in which
discourses and policy narratives are advocating a renewed territorial policy approach. Part 3
investigates the CLLDmain technical and administrative features and its innovations, while
Part 4 presents the state of play of its implementation across the EU, showing how its appli-
cation that occurred in the various countries and regions has generated diversiﬁed
approaches in termsof territorial foci andCLLDstrategies. The conclusion evaluates the con-
tribution of the paper and draws the line for further research agendas.
2. Framing the debate: a multi-level governance issue
2.1. Task-speciﬁc jurisdiction and its institutional dimensions
The reorganization of the governance process and the interactions among a variety of public
authorities, local private actors and citizens through the identiﬁcation of a tailored space has
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been addressed the post-functionalist governance thesis (Hooghe&Marks, 2009). The sub-
stantial contribution to the governance debate is rooted in the identiﬁcation of two types of
multi-level governance processes: general-purpose and task-speciﬁc jurisdiction, or type I
and II governance. In planning literature, these two categories have beenmutated in the dis-
tinction between hard- and soft-space initiatives (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009), and
they were mainly based on two distinguishing variables: the territory that is concerned by
the governance process and the competences of the ‘jurisdiction’ applied to it.
The ﬁrst type of governance, which is characterized by hard space, relates to the
general-purpose, non-intersecting, and durable jurisdiction such as the one of established
administrative levels of government, with a recognized territory and encompassing
administrative competences. They have formal arenas and processes under the jurisdiction
of the public authority, often statutory and open to democratic processes and local politi-
cal inﬂuence. The second type relates to the task-speciﬁc, intersecting, and ﬂexible juris-
diction, and addresses in particular those policy arenas that go beyond formal
territorialized authorities. The ‘soft spaces’ are ad-hoc designed territories where discre-
tion and interpretation determine the spatial domain and implementation happens
through bargaining and ﬂexible arrangements (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009).
The task-speciﬁc jurisdiction with soft space has been typically associated with cross-
border cooperation under the EU initiative (Metzger & Schmitt, 2012) and metropolitan
management in functional urban areas (Adam & Green, 2016). They are characterized by
a growing preference for using fuzzy boundaries in establishing new ‘sub-regions’ with a
speciﬁc planning and policy task (Allmendinger, Haughton, Knieling, & Othengrafen,
2015). At the same time, the tailored deﬁnition of a territory with its arbitrary boundaries,
and the selectiveness of the involved actors are the primary constituency of the strategic
spatial planning approach (Albrechts, 2006) advocated by the place-based narrative, out
of which LEADER at ﬁrst and the CLLD later have been conceived.
In the CLLD, moreover, as explicitly mention in its acronym, the involvement of the
local community is a primary connotative characteristics. In these types of initiatives,
the participation of local actors happens through voluntary commitment associated to
the speciﬁc process in which a policy problem is ﬁrst identiﬁed and then addressed
with a strategic plan through animation and participatory process. Using Hooghe and
Marks’s description of Type II jurisdictions, these initiatives do not seek to resolve funda-
mental disagreements by deliberation but, instead, to share a collective project among
individuals and actors who share some geographical or functional space and who have
a common need for collective decision-making (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 205).
This dimension brings in two considerations. First, it raises questions about political
legitimacy and democratic representativeness of policy processes whose spatial and
social agendas become arbitrarily selective (Swyngedouw, 2005). The process based on
voluntary adherence does not aim at solving disagreements but instead at conveying
forces around a proactive policy project–‘Type I jurisdictions choose citizens, while citi-
zens choose Type II jurisdictions’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 206).
The alignment of actors to an existing hegemonic policy narrative or their exclusion
from the political arena (Jessop, 2001) could therefore become an opaque technique
deployed by hegemonic coalitions that removes the political dimension and neutralizes
potential antagonistic voices. This appears to be the core of what critical geographers
have pointed as a de-politicized process and the removal of the conﬂict in planning
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(Swyngedouw, 2005). At the same time, it calls for new forms of collective control, as
suggested by Metzger (Metzger, 2011), who points at forms of forums and arenas in
which institutional arrangements can be challenged.
Second, the institutional construction rather than the policy agenda becomes a political
act. Hajer (2003) suggests that we should conceive what has been named type II govern-
ance or soft-planning initiatives more in terms of ‘stand-alone practices’ because they are
not directly supported by traditionally legitimized institutional arrangements. The tra-
ditional authorities have a part in constructing the institutional frame, but they no
longer have a direct democratic representative responsibility on these initiatives. The insti-
tutional dimensions of the stand-alone practices become themselves a prime site of politics
(Hajer, 2003, p. 191) and need to be investigated as such.
Therefore, the policy investigation of CLLD strategies and results, albeit necessary,
addresses only a partial dimension of its characteristics (see for instance FAME &
FARNET, 2018). The above mentioned debate indicates that it is also worth investigating
the enabled institutional characteristics in order to understand the political dimensions of
its normative framework, which is based on the relationship between policy project, ter-
ritorial design and community involvement, as discussed in the following subsection.
2.2. The territorial synchrony of the spatial–temporal ﬁx
The importance of the institutional dimensions of the ‘stand-alone practices’, such as
those enabled by the CLLD, points at the need to investigate the role of the newly
formed arrangements and potentially new jurisdiction, or to use a slightly diﬀerent
term – with an important semantic implication – of its polity. While Hooghe and
Marks have left unquestioned the nature of the polity and the institutional dimension
of the governance process, Hajer (2003) pointed at the speciﬁcity of it, in particular high-
lighting the deliberative dimension of these types of polities. Hajer (2003) recognizes that
the policy analysis can no longer consider polity as a stable entity, echoing Hooghe and
Marks’s emphasis on the proliferation of type II jurisdictions. He gives a strong emphasis
to the discursive construction of the polity: the polity ‘(…) cannot be captured in the com-
fortable terms of generally accepted rules, but is created through deliberation. (…) As poli-
tics is conducted in an institutional void, both policy and polity are dependent on the
outcome of discursive interactions’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 161).
If the task-speciﬁc jurisdiction generated under the CLLD initiative is a new territorialized
polity (Piattoni, 2009) that emerges from amulti-level governance process, as it will be shown
in Part 3, the discursive interaction has a speciﬁc and locally-created dimension in which the
new polity, the functional territory, the involved actors and the policy agenda are bounded in
a political project. Such a task-speciﬁc jurisdiction, even if very instrumental or weak, is a
temporary polity constituted by an administrative board in which local public and private
actors, and local public authorities could share the discursive construction of a functional ter-
ritory associated to a development strategy, or in other terms, to a spatial imaginary.
These elements come together in what Hajer deﬁnes as the triangle of governance,
whose synchrony – as he warned about – is at question. The ‘triangle of governance’
according to Hajer is made of three elements: politico-administrative institutions, societal
processes and cultural adherences (Hajer, 2003, p. 182). Such a speciﬁc governance setting
is then understood in terms of a territorially based relationship among these three
682 L. SERVILLO
variables. In this ‘triangle of governance’, the legitimacy and eﬀectiveness of politico-
administrative institutions are typically based on ‘the successful ordering of societal pro-
cesses as well as on the creation of suﬃcient cultural adherence in a particular territory’
(Hajer, 2003, p. 182). Therefore, the societal eﬃcacy of these practices, which are no
longer unquestionable (as in type I governance), could be considered in terms of territorial
synchrony among the three components.
A state-theory and strategic-relational critique reinforces the interpretative capacity of
the interrelations between spatial imaginary, policy instrument and polity; it goes beyond
what appears to be the limit of Hajer’s conceptualization, i.e. the sort of institutional void
in which they are left alone. The institutional void has generated approaches that pointed
at non-state-centric geographies associated with these practices (Walsh, Jacuniak-Suda,
Knieling, & Othengrafen, 2012), On the contrary, in Jessop’s perspective (Jessop, 2016),
two important elements are connected in the political process: the institutional technology
through which the process is activated – as well as the state is reaﬃrmed – and the spatial–
temporal ﬁx that is conveyed.
The scheme of Figure 1 brings together the threads of these approaches in a conceptu-
alization of the governance dynamic and the role of its components. The hypothesis is that,
despite being a project-funding mechanism, the CLLD can be challenged by this articu-
lated interpretative scheme, in which the policy instrument generates a spatial temporary
arrangement. Consequently, the ‘territorial synergy’ that connects a spatial imaginary with
a socio-institutional process becomes an analytical dimension.
The spatial imaginary is a narrative construction that tights together a functional ter-
ritory, based on a snapshot of its socio-ecological characteristics, and the strategic
policy agenda (i.e. how the characteristics of the ‘place’ are mobilized). At the same
time, the socio-institutional process indicates how the local community (or some commu-
nities instead of others) determines the political-administrative conﬁguration of the task-
speciﬁc jurisdiction (e.g. of the LAG, in the CLLD case). It happens through the expression
of a societal process that is territorially bounded and connected to the policy agenda. Con-
sequently, a tailored space and its polity construction could be challenged in these analyti-
cal terms. Even if apparently modest as policy ambition and volatile as polity construction
(as potentially the CLLD), it activates a place and path-dependent cultural process that is
worth investigating.
Jessop describes such institutional conﬁgurations as a spatial–temporal ﬁx, which is
space-related and temporary. It
(…) is a complementary set of institutions that, via institutional design, imitation, impo-
sition, or chance evolution oﬀer (within given parametric limits) a temporary, partial, and
relatively stable solution to the coordination problems involved in securing economic, politi-
cal, or social order. (Jessop, 2016, p. 25)
He builds on Harvey’s interpretation (Harvey, 2001), for which spatial ﬁx refers to ‘many
different forms of spatial reorganization and geographical expansion that serve to manage,
at least for some time, crisis-tendencies inherent in capital accumulation’ (Jessop, 2006,
p. 145). Sharing the idea that a spatial–temporal ﬁx is part of a process of destroying
and re-conﬁguring space in order to overcome overproduction, reduce a surplus of
labour, and to deal with over-accumulation of capital, Jessop’s interpretation emphasizes
its political role.
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In this sense, even a limited initiative such as the CLLD could be challenged in this
terms. The spatial–temporal ﬁx resolves,
(…) partially and provisionally at best, the contradictions and dilemmas inherent in capital-
ism by establishing spatial and temporal boundaries within which a relatively durable pattern
of ‘structured coherence’ can be secured and by shifting certain costs of securing this coher-
ence beyond these spatial and temporal boundaries. (Jessop, 2006, p. 155)
Here two dimensions are crucial. First, such a political dimension takes the form of a
spatial and policy narrative, which strategically selects winners and losers linked to the
Figure 1. Interpretative scheme of spatio-temporal ﬁx and its meta-governance. Author: own
elaboration.
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uneven social and spatial distribution of beneﬁts and to its associated local development
strategy. Second, the space is not only a container of governance processes, as it would be
in type I governance / hard space practice, but it becomes a means, through which a socio-
institutional order is temporarily established.
2.3. The meta-governance and its normative framework
Contrary to the idea of the institutional void (Hajer, 2003), the meta-governance through
which the state reaﬃrm itself plays a crucial role (Jessop, 2016). If the meta-governance is
the ‘government of governance’ (Bell, Hindmoor, & Mols, 2010), the EU, the national and
regional levels have a primary role in the deﬁnition of the CLLD governance dynamics, as
extensively proven in Part 4 of the paper. The scheme in Figure 1 indicates four key
dimensions (among the several ones that can be listed) that have a normative role in
the multi-level decision making.
The two most visible roles are the deﬁnition of the rules and the ﬁnancial support for
the initiative; together they form the most explicit elements of the institutional technology.
The rules for governance and the regulatory order under which the actors perform ensure
the compatibility of diﬀerent governance mechanisms and regimes. In the case of the
CLLD, it combines for instance a hierarchical deﬁnition of elements (the funds, the
characteristics of the process, etc.), and a recognition of bottom-up and deliberative
decision-making by civil society groups through stakeholder-led democracy. At the
same time, the ﬁnancial arrangements support the activation of the policy process, such
as the territorial design and its strategic policy agenda, as extensively shown in section
4 about the combination of ESI Funds.
However, there are other dimensions in which the meta-governance has a strategic-
selective capacity, such as the promotion of governance arenas and the narratives of
diﬀerent policy agendas. The former inﬂuence the promotion of practices and the acti-
vation of governance networks. It promotes – or disempowers – practices that enable
the self-understanding of identities, strategic capacities, and interests of individual and
collective actors in diverse strategic contexts and speciﬁc territories (Jessop, 2016).
The latter identiﬁes the importance of the policy agenda as an outcome of the inter-
action among diﬀerent levels, combining hierarchic relationships and interpretation and
re-construction of political discourses. The discourses in policy agenda are translated in
policy strategies and they have an eﬀect on ﬁnancial arrangements and ultimately on
the policy design at a local level. The conceptualization of the territorial cohesion
agenda and H2020’s aims at the EU level frame the policy construction of the CLLD at
the national and regional levels, in which the interpretation of the EU policy message
acts as a normative role through funds allocation and policy orientation.
The following section of the paper addresses in particular this issue. In the attempt of
clarifying the characteristics of the CLLD, it investigates at ﬁrst the policy narrative in
which the CLLD was conceived.
3. A policy context: the rise (again) of a territorial narrative
The policy use of the EU Funds, when related to regional and economic development, sees
at least two broad approaches. On the one hand, the mainstream way of allocating funds to
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the Member States and their regional authorities follows a set of speciﬁc criteria and
targets, characterized by a substantial a-territoriality. On the other hand, some initiatives
use a more integrated and spatial approach, combining strategic planning and local devel-
opment modalities to address a more territorial-oriented policy agenda. The latter has
characterized a small but signiﬁcant portion of the European funds expenditure along
for decades. In particular, with attention to the local dimension, the involvement of
local actors and the support of bottom-up initiatives are part of a recurrent attention to
‘community-led’ practices (despite the ambiguity of this terms). The rise and the disap-
pearance of several initiatives has been the focus of several studies in the broad ﬁeld of
the European Planning Studies (Dühr, Colomb, & Nadin, 2010; McCann, 2015).
In particular, over the last decade of the previous century, strong attention toward
urban deprived areas and a question about how to trigger local development dynamics
gave birth to an experimental phase of innovative EU-led initiatives (Atkinson, 2001;
Janin Rivolin & Faludi, 2005). Among others, it is worth pointing at the Urban Pilot
Project and URBAN programme, mainly dedicated to urban areas; LEADER programme
dedicated to rural and ﬁshery areas; and EQUAL programme, which did not have a spatial
speciﬁcation but had been mainly used in urban contexts for integrated actions toward
speciﬁc social groups.
The common dimension of these policy tools was the experimentation of new ways of
tailoring strategies for economic and social regeneration of speciﬁc places. At the core of
their approach was a strong emphasis on bottom-up dynamics for the deﬁnition of a
shared approach with the engagement of the beneﬁciaries of EU funds and enterprises,
together with public authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social partners
and citizens.
That historical period saw a stronger territorial speciﬁcation of the quest for socio-
economic cohesion and spatial justice taking place under the debate on territorial cohesion
(Faludi, 2006), which became a ﬂagship concept in describing the aim of the EU policy
domain with an explicit spatial attention, albeit diversiﬁed political agendas connected
to it (Servillo, 2010). Despite being a niche in the Structural funds expenditure, these
experimental programmes constituted the core of an EU policy domain explicitly dedi-
cated to an integrated approach to spatial and territorial development and the operative
tools for territorial cohesion (Dühr et al., 2010).
However, as often in policy life-cycles, some of these initiatives disappeared after they
reached a maturity phase. In particular, URBAN and EQUAL programmes lasted until the
ﬁrst EU programming period of the 2000s (2000–2006), when they became mainstreamed
(Atkinson & Zimmermann, 2016), with the loss of their experimental underpinning. The
oﬃcial narrative behind this choice stated the necessity to normalize the integrated terri-
torial approach according to eachMember State’s necessity, and to simplify the procedures
(McCann, 2015). Hence, a Cohesion Policy structure with three Cohesion policy objectives
embedded all the experimental initiatives, which were left to the decision of the Member
States. Only the LEADER programme somehow survived (Dax, Strahl, Kirwan, & Maye,
2016), leaving this local development tool dedicated to rural and maritime areas as the
only explicit EU initiative inspired by a community-led approach.
A decade later, the discussion that preceded the current programming period (2014–
2020) took on board a series of criticisms (Mendez, 2013), including those about the con-
troversial outcome of the pilot programme mainstreaming, as highlighted in the 5th
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Cohesion report (European Commission, 2010). This included a wider critique of the EU
cohesion policy, concerning in particular the lack of territorial sensitivity, well summar-
ized by the Barca report (Barca, 2009). It remarked the failure of the one-size-ﬁts-all of
the traditional regional development approach and the importance of investments
ﬁnalized to support local resources and social and territorial capital.
The place-based approach advocated by the Barca Report became a fortunate buzzword
that carried a plea for a more local and endogenous development approach (Barca,
McCann, & Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). A higher recognition of a territorial dimension, a
stronger role of local development, and a normative support in endogenous initiatives
were the elements that brought a new momentum for initiatives based on community par-
ticipation through bottom-up dynamics.
The current programming period contains a stronger territorial narrative that is present
throughout the current ESI fund regulations and it attributes its legacy to the previously-
described debate. Elements of this narrative come back in the recitals and core articles of
several documents, such as the Common Provisions Regulations, the Common Strategic
Framework, the regulations for the individual funds, Commission guidance, and reports
(De Bruijn, 2017). In the language of the ESI regulations, territorial cohesion echoes a
place-based approach–it is about combining ESI Funds into integrated packages, which
are tailor-made to ﬁt speciﬁc territorial needs taking the roles and speciﬁcities of
diﬀerent types of territories into account (European Union, 2013).
In this frame, the Common Provisions Regulations for the ESI Funds created three
policy tools: CLLD, Sustainable Urban Development (SUD) and Integrated Territorial
Investment (ITI) (art 32–35 and 36). They are tools of the cohesion policy later named
the ‘Territorial Delivery Mechanism’, which is an interesting term to make explicit their
role in operationalizing the EU funds expenditure through a more pronounced terri-
tory-oriented vocation. A synergy among these instruments is also foreseen, it can be
arranged by the Member States and their regional and local authorities to address
speciﬁc socio-spatial challenges. However, only CLLD has an explicit community-led
approach among the three policy tools (De Bruijn, 2017).
The combination of a renewed cognitive and political approach to local development in
the current EU programming period strengthens institutional framework made of dis-
course, rules and resources (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999), which all together supports the
diﬀusion of a new territorialized approach in the EU policy. The deﬁnition of Territorial
Delivery Mechanisms is a prominent policy outcome, while CLLD represents – on paper –
the most evident resurgence of a place-based approach.
4. The technical design of CLLD
The CLLD technical and administrative characteristics are framed by the new territorial
narrative and have been speciﬁed by the EU regulation and additionally by two guidance
notes issued by the EU Commission (European Commission, 2014a, 2014b) next to the
primary legislation. Even though the latter are not legal documents, they explain the inten-
tions and were often used by Commission services to steer the implementation of the
Member States and regions in a certain direction (De Bruijn, 2017).
Out of these documents, the community-led dimension intended by the EU Commis-
sion appears to have four connotative dimensions – at least for the purpose of this study:
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1. Integrated and multi-sectorial strategy, with a variegated portfolio of funds.
2. Speciﬁc tailored area, which goes beyond the traditional territorial jurisdiction of the
public administration.
3. The Local Action Group (LAG), which represents the key institutional structure rooted
in an innovative relationship between local society and public authority.
4. The multi-level articulation of choices that frame the implementation of the CLLD at
the local level.
The ﬁrst and more relevant element that characterizes the CLLD initiative is the Local
development strategy tailored to the needs of the designated place. Although ‘strategy’ is
not part of the acronym, the regulation puts great emphasis on the fact that the CLLD
follows a strategic planning approach (Albrechts, 2010). The CLLD strategy should indi-
cate the target area and the related population, and should contain a SWOT analysis, a
territorial strategy with a vision, an action plan, a management and monitoring plan,
and a detailed ﬁnancial structure, as it was for the previous LEADER programme.
The main diﬀerence between CLLD and LEADER is however the wider ﬁnancial avail-
ability and, thanks to this, a wider operative capacity. The previous ﬁnancial support for
the LEADER initiative was limited to either the European Agricultural Funds for Regional
Development (EAFRD) or the European Maritime and Fishery Fund (EMFF), with a
resulting limitation to rural or coastal areas and a narrow range of eligible interventions.
In the new version, the CLLD extends the LEADER approach to two other European
Structural Investment Funds: European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and Euro-
pean Social Fund (ESF). The CLLD strategy can be integrated and multi-sectoral
through the support of diﬀerent funds, mainly ESIF, but potentially also national ones.
As a consequence, the CLLD range of actions compared to LEADER has grown along
two potential lines (Peters, 2013). First, it has a broader thematic scope due to the eligi-
bility of more thematic interventions under diﬀerent ESI Funds, and thus potentially
more integrated actions. Second, it addresses diversiﬁed scales and types of territory,
which can go from urban neighbourhoods with speciﬁc sub-urban issues, or medium
towns and wider urban agenda, to sub regions with a combined attention to smaller
towns and rural areas, and eventually their urban-rural interlinkage.
This issue is the key decisional feature of the meta-governance that steers the
implementation of the CLLD initiative. Whether the initiative will address for instance
urban neighbourhoods with a socially inclusive strategy, or will target growth and econ-
omic development for local enterprises in a sub region with medium urban areas,
depends on two correlated dimensions: the availability of funds made available by the
multi-scalar decision-making; and the policy initiative at local and regional level taking
place within the margin allowed by the Funds eligibilities.
The second crucial dimension is that the CLLD has the vocation to be local area-based,
which is functional to the strategy-based approach. The CLLD can identify a tailored area
according to its speciﬁc socio-spatial features and the appropriate match to the strategy.
The CLLD articles do not refer to any type of area, implying that the CLLD can be
applied anywhere. CPR-Article 32 states only that the CLLD should focus on sub-regional
areas (European Union, 2013). Despite its neutral deﬁnition, however, the Commission
guidance on the CLLD stresses the wider possibilities at the disposal of the initiative –
it has the opportunity to address also small urban centres in rural areas, deprived city
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neighbourhoods, industrial districts, brownﬁeld sites, suburbs, etc. (European Commis-
sion, 2014b). As mentioned in the introduction, it represents an important novelty, con-
sidering that the 2007–2013 programming period the LEADER approach was limited in its
territorial scope to rural areas covered by the EAFRD and ﬁsheries areas covered by the
EMFF.
There is an additional speciﬁcation with consequences on the operationalization of the
territorial target. The CPR ﬁxes the demographic limits between 10,000 and 150,000
inhabitants (CPR art.33) for a single tailored area interested by CLLD strategy. In this
way, it prohibits major cities to have a CLLD for their entire city but favours neighbour-
hood interventions, such as those in the former URBAN initiative and strategies dedicated
to a group of small and medium towns and cities. This is in line with the growing policy
awareness about small and medium sized towns in Europe and their territorial role (Ser-
villo, Atkinson, & Hamdouch, 2017).
The third -and essential- institutional characteristics of the CLLD are that the respon-
sibility for the design and implementation of the community-led local development strat-
egy should be given to a Local Action Group (LAG). Following the LEADERmethodology,
the LAG is an entity composed of representatives of public and private local socio-econ-
omic interests. The conﬁguration of voting rights in the LAG is relevant because it intro-
duces a new dimension of deliberate democracy. Neither the public authority in the sum of
its constituencies nor any single interest group can have more than 49% of the voting
rights (CPR, art32). Hence, the public authority becomes part of a composite polity that
cannot be ruled by a single actor. This dimension challenges the traditional role of
public authority, which is no longer the only state agency responsible for the budget dedi-
cated to the local development strategy.
The LAG is tasked with designing and implementing the CLLD strategy and its oper-
ationalization. This includes the ruling of capacity-building and training initiatives for
local actors and the ﬁnancing of real projects brought forward by these actors. It is also
in charge of animation (such as information campaign, support and promotion of activi-
ties, etc.) and participatory processes, which are ﬁnancially covered by the CLLD budget.
Once the CLLD strategy is approved, the cost of animation to facilitate exchange between
stakeholders and capacity-building training actions can be up to 25% of overall costs. A
lead Fund can support all running and animation costs, which make the integrated and
coordinated use of the various ESI funds a prominent feature of the CLLD. Neither ITI
nor other Territorial Delivery Mechanisms have such provisions.
It is noteworthy that the European Commission does not consider LAGs as formal
intermediate bodies, i.e. an entity that plays a role in the management of European
funds and needs to prove its capacity through administrative validation (as for instance
the urban authorities dealing with the ITI in the ERDF management). Hence, it is
rather a ‘light’ deliberative polity without strong legal commitment and territorial recog-
nition if not for the management of the CLLD strategy.
Finally, the fourth dimension is the multi-level decision making process that acts as a
meta-governance process framing the initiative. Although the community-led approach is
the distinct feature of CLLD, the upper decision-making is determinant. This has every-
thing to do with the design of the ESI Funds whose characteristics are not only set by
the European Commission but further speciﬁed and implemented at the national and
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regional level by ministries and Managing Authorities of the various ESI Funds according
to the shared management procedure (Mendez & Bachtler, 2011).
The following steps are the fundamental steps in the establishment of the meta-govern-
ance framework. First, the decision of including the CLLD among the Territorial Delivery
Mechanisms is a choice of the Member State. The decision is ﬁxed in the Partnership
Agreement signed between the EU Commission and the Member State at the beginning
of the programming period. Then, the Managing Authorities of the ESI Funds at national
and regional levels need to operationalize the choice and decide on two crucial variables: to
conﬁrm whether the CLLD is used for a speciﬁc fund and whether to integrate the funds in
a joint Local Development strategy or use them in a mono-funded fashion. The operatio-
nalization will include also the decision on other ‘arrangements’ for the CLLD: whether
there will be a lead fund, how the selection process for CLLD strategies is organized,
which tasks are given to the LAGs, and what challenges CLLD should tackle.
Finally, the regulation (CPR, art 33) prescribes that individual CLLD strategies should
be chosen by a selection committee set up by the Managing Authority(s) at the latest by 31
December 2017, through dedicated local calls. The principle is that candidate LAGs will be
in competition with each other for designing the best CLLD strategy. This selection com-
mittee at the Managing Authority level will also decide on the funds involved and their
allocated funding.
5. The dimensions of CLLD as a variegated government-led initiative
The decision-making that must to be undertaken before starting a community-led initiat-
ive forms meta-governance framework that acts deterministically toward the options
available for the local implementation. Although the regulation is the same for all, the
available funds and operational modalities for the CLLD can be diﬀerent throughout
the EU, both between the Member States and even between regions within the Member
States. In this perspective, the CLLD instrument appears as a community-led as much
as a government-led (and Fund-led) initiative.
The partnership agreements signed by each Member State with the EU Commission at
the beginning of the programming period (in 2014) ﬁx the type of funds that are eligible
for the CLLD and whether to allow a multi-funding structure of the ﬁnanced LAGs.
Bearing in mind that the use of EAFRD is compulsory (5% of the EAFRD), the upper
part of Table 1 lists the attribution of funds for the CLLD in each country. On the top
are the countries that decided to accept the challenge (or at least to maintain openness
to the possibility) to ﬁnance a wider array of interventions through several Funds (three
or four ESIF). Descending in the table are the more conservative countries who decided
to remain in the consolidated path of the previous programming period with only the agri-
cultural and maritime funds eligible for the CLLD. Additionally, the bottom part of the
table completes the picture distinguishing the countries that accepted the possibility to
have multi-funded strategies and those who allowed only mono-fund strategies even if
they indicated more than one eligible fund. On this speciﬁcally restrictive side are CY,
EE, IE and NL, who allowed various funds but not in an integrated manner. Overall,
the table shows a generally high potential reception of the CLLD innovative dimensions
widespread across Europe. Almost 75% of the Member States accepted the multi-
funding principle in their partnership.
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The real implementation of the CLLD initiative, however, shows a diﬀerent and more
articulated pattern. The overall ﬁgure of the implementation indicates a steady growth and
a progressive consolidation of the initiative across the various programming periods, as
reported in Table 2. The decision to include again ERDF and ESF as eligible funds as it
was originally conceived in the last decade of the previous century seems to have contrib-
uted to its development and the aﬃrmation of a community-led way of approaching local
development (Miller, 2014).
The number of more than 3000 LAGs indicates a widespread phenomenon of practices
in which Local Action Groups activated community-led initiatives in the EU. In particular,
an increment of 50% of the LAG compared to the previous EU programming period indi-
cates a recognition of the validity of the bottom-up approach or at least the will to exper-
iment with it and the consolidation of this speciﬁc local development approach across the
Member States.
The picture becomes more interesting when the overall sum of the current LAGs is
broken down by fund composition, as indicated in Table 3. On the one hand, the table
shows that strong legacy with the former LEADER setting. In the current programming
period, a large majority of LAGS has the same ﬁnancial setting that was allowed in the
previous programming period: 2201 LAGs are mono-funded EAFRD and 263 LAGs are
mono-funded EMFF, while 66 multi-funded EAFRD-EMFF are just an integration of
these two Funds (and their eligible interventions). They are LAGs with ﬁnancial
support to rural and maritime activities. Hence, despite 75% of countries that accepted
the multi-funded possibility, the recurrent funding structure remains the one of the ‘old
LEADER approach’, for which the 5% compulsory measure of the EAFRD is a determi-
nant factor.
On the other hand, the novelty of using the two additional funds counts for one fourth
of the total, with 788 LAGs combining the funds in diﬀerent ways (Table 4). The ERDF
and ESF can be used for mono-funded LAGs, for multi-funded LAGs with these two
Table 1. Potential ﬁnancial support for CLLD in the EU Member States.
Category Member State
EAFRD, ERDF, ESF, EMFF BG, DE, ES, FR, GR, IT, PL, PT, RO, SE, UK
EAFRD, ERDF, ESF CZ, HU
EAFRD, ERDF, EMFF SI
EAFRD, ESF, EMFF LT
EAFRD, ERDF AT, NL, SK
EAFRD, EMFF CY,DK, EE, FI, IE, LV
EAFRD BE, LU, MT
Multi-funding allowed AT, BG, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, HU, IT, LT, LV, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, UK
Not allowed BE, CY, EE, IE, LU, MT, NL
Source: own elaboration based on DG Agri survey (Jasińska-Mühleck, 2016).
Table 2. Evolution from LEADER to CLLD in the EU.
Stage Duration Funds Number of LAGs
LEADER1 1991–93 EAGGF, ESF, ERDF 217
LEADER2 1994–99 EAGGF, ESF, ERDF 821
LEADER+ 2000–06 EAGGF 893 in EU15 (+ 250 LEADER+ type measures in 2004–06 in 6 MS)
LEADER axis 2007–13 EAFRD, EMFF 2200 in EU27
CLLD 2014–20 EAFRD, EMFF, ERDF, ESF 3318 in EU28
Source: Miller (2014) for the period 1991–2013; own elaboration for 2014–2020 data (more details in Table 3).
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Table 3. Number of LAG and ESIF structure per the Member States.
ESIF
structure
Mono
EAFRDa
Mono
EMFFa
EAFRD-
EMFFa
Mono
ERDFb
Mono
ESFb
Mono
ETCb
EAFRD-
ERDFb
EAFRD-
ESFb
EMFF-
ERDFb
EMFF-
ESFb
ERDF-
ESFb
EAFRD-
EMFF-
ERDFb
EAFRD-
EMFF-
ESFb
EAFRD-
ERDF-
ESFb
EMFF-
ERDF-
ESFb
EAFRD-
EMFF-
ERDF-
ESFb TOTCountry
Austria 69 8 77
Belgium 32 32
Bulgaria 25 9 4 6 29 73
Croatia 54 14 68
Cyprus 4 4
Czechia 27 151 178
Denmark 19 3 7 29
Estonia 26 8 34
Finland 55 10 65
France 330 23 353
Germany 298 29 23 350
Greece 14 1 22 1 4 1 10 53
Hungary 103 99 202
Ireland 29 7 36
Italy 168 46 9 23 246
Latvia 29 6 35
Lithuania 46 10 3 23 82
Luxembourg 5 5
Malta 3 3
Netherlands 20 1 21
Poland 251 24 11 7 1 29 1 324
Portugal 7 57 24 5 93
Romania 239 16 37 292
Slovakia 110 110
Slovenia 33 4 37
Spain 251 41 292
Sweden 2 4 3 2 1 28 8 48
UK 129 11 8 24 172
CBC AT-IT 4 4
TOT 2201 263 66 1 31 4 208 12 0 0 219 4 11 284 5 9 3318
Note: There are four cross-border LAGs along the Austrian-Italian border. They are indicated as CBC (Cross-Border Cooperation) AT-IT, and the related Fund is European Territorial Cooperation (ETC).
The cut-oﬀ date of the dataset is July 2018. Small variations may still occur in some countries.
aData gathered through a combination of sources, in particular ELARD and FARNET websites, and direct contacts to the interested Managing Authorities through the support of the Polish repre-
sentative in ELARD, Mr. Krzysztof Kwatera.
bData gathered through dedicated survey, involving all MAs whose Operational Programme reported CLLD as Territorial Delivery Mechanism for ERDF and ESF Servillo, 2017.
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funds, or in combination with EAFRD or EMFF. Therefore, these LAGs could be either a
complete novelty for the administrations and the territories or a wider ﬁnancial inte-
gration to the existing local development practices dedicated to rural and maritime
areas (Servillo & De Bruijn, 2018).
Nevertheless, given the optional use of the CLLD under ERDF and ESF the uptake of
the new ﬁnancial opportunity can be qualiﬁed as a moderate success. The opportunity of
activating multiple funds, including the newly available ERDF and ESF, has been well
received in several contexts hereby strengthening the integrated, place-based and
bottom-up approach of cohesion policy (Servillo, 2017).
The tables show, however, certain inertia in taking advantage of the available ﬁnancial
innovation oﬀered by the use of the new funds and the possibility to integrate them.
Whether this is a matter of unavoidable resistance in pursuing changes in such a
complex institutional framework or of national and regional strategic choices because per-
ceived as an over-complicated ﬁnancial procedure – or a combination of these factors –
has been partially investigated elsewhere (Servillo & De Bruijn, 2018), but it still deserves
a more dedicated study in particular adopting national or regional foci.
It is important however to highlight that theﬁnancial structure of LAGshas an important
implication in the territorial outcomeof local development strategies as indicated inTable 4.
The 75% of community-led initiatives consolidates the traditional LEADER approach
mainly in the domain of rural and ﬁshery development strategy. The remaining ‘new-
approach’ initiatives extend their range of actions to a vast variety of actions and territories.
In particular, it is worth underlining that the new funds ERDF and ESF, when used alone,
conﬁrm a resurgence of the URBAN and EQUAL-like initiatives, which focus explicitly on
urban contexts. At the same time, themajority of the cases that integrate diﬀerent funds tend
to focus on sub-regional areas, whose strategy combines urban and rural dimensions, over-
coming a structural limitation of the traditional LEADER approach.
A more detailed investigation of the territorial approach of the LAGs using the newly
available funds (ERDF and ESF) has provided more insights in the relationship between
funds, territorial focus and spatial strategy (Servillo, 2017; Servillo & De Bruijn, 2018). Evi-
dence in the study has shown that, when ERDF and/or ESF are combined with EAFRD, a
predominant focus on sub-regions with rural characteristics and small urban settlements
characterizes the majority of these CLLD strategies. At the same time, the multi-fund
Table 4. Overview of CLLD fund structures.
Mobilized
ESIF
EAFRD EMFF ERDF ESF ERDF + ESF EAFRD +
EMFF
Other ESIF
combinations
2500 LAGs
Mono-funded strategies
Financed only with one fund
818 LAGs
Multi-funded strategies
Integration of various Funds
Number of
LAGs
2201 263 1 + 4 31 219 66 533
LAG’s
Territorial
focus
Rural
LAGs
Fishery
LAGs
1 Urban
+4 CBC
Urban-
rural
Urban
LAGs
Prevailingly
Urban LAGs
Rural-
Fishery
LAGs
LAGs with various
territorial foci
(prevailingly urban-
rural)
Traditional/
new
approach
2464 LAGs
Traditional
approach
854 LAGs – New approach
255 LAGs – Exclusively new funds 599 LAGs – Various combinations
Source: own elaboration (more details in Table 3).
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structure increases the chance to support a wider range of thematic interventions, integrat-
ing rural measure and regional development and/or social inclusion dedicated to the
urban areas (Servillo & De Bruijn, 2018).
To conclude, these results show how the CLLD initiative has a strongly variegated
application at national and regional levels. A much more in-depth analysis can be
further conducted on the speciﬁc meta-governance implications in speciﬁc contexts
and on the eﬀects of the implementations that occurred at the local level. What
remains clear, however, is that the above-exposed evidence indicates that the CLLD
institutional technology, which pursues a bottom-up governance dynamics at the local
level, is strongly inﬂuenced by the rules of funding, and therefore embedded in a
meta-governance process in the shadow of multi-level state’s hierarchy (Jessop, 2016).
Several meta-governance dimensions shape the framework in which local initiatives
can take place. The enabled local polities have a socio-institutional and policy design
that is framed by hierarchic decision-making, which characterizes the conditions of
the CLLD implementation.
6. Conclusion
The paper contributes to the European Spatial Planning studies investigating the CLLD
initiative used as a ‘Territorial Delivery Mechanism’ of ESI Funds in support of place-
based practices. Its application in the EU counts for more than 3000 supported Local
Action Groups and it indicates the wide-reach of this policy instrument to address local devel-
opment within a renewed support of integrated territorial initiatives of the EU policy making.
An institutionalist perspective enables a conceptualization of the institutional dimen-
sions as a challenge instead of a pre-given asset. Using Salet’s words,
(t)he evaluation of the public action’s legitimacy and eﬀectiveness requires on the one hand
the understanding of the co-evolution of purposive action and situational problem articula-
tion, and on the other hand the evaluation of the normative conditions on public action.
(Salet, 2018, p. 59)
In this light, the paper moves beyond the one-scale policy-content analysis, it provides a
more encompassing interpretative frame, in which the operationalization of the initiative
at the local level is connected with its contextual meta-governance. The theoretical inves-
tigation has provided the conceptual elements to identify the CLLD as institutional tech-
nology and the LAG as deliberative polity in which a socio-institutional process pursues a
spatial imaginary in the shadow of multi-level state’s hierarchy.
Accordingly, the appropriateness of a tailored space for a local initiative cannot be eval-
uated in abstract terms, but only in connection with the associated policy-oriented spatial
imaginary. The CLLD local initiative can be questioned – as indicated in Figure 1 –
through the connections between the following dimensions: the spatial-institutional
design occurring between LAG and functional territory, the LAG’s policy design of a
policy agenda, the community’s cultural adherence with the territory, and the societal
process that casts the role of community in the policy-agenda implementation.
This perspective also allows for a deeper understanding of the local dynamics and their
evaluation. Even if the innovative dimension of the LAG, whose decision power cannot be
held by formal public authorities (with the limit of 49%), experiments a new form of
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democratic deliberation, its legitimacy and the generated power relation cannot be given
for granted. The social adherence of the governance process is determined by the eﬀective-
ness of having an inclusive societal process in the implementation of the policy agenda.
Hence, we need to recognize the strategic selectiveness of the initiative toward the local
actors. The spatial imaginary through which a functional territory is associated with a
policy agenda strategically selects the potential actors and projects to be ﬁnanced. If not
socially constructed, the risk is to fall in corporatist attitude at the advantage of local elites.
On the broad picture, the analysis of the current state of the implementation in the EU
has shown to what extent the meta-governance of every Member State plays a determinist
role. The variety of the CLLD implementation indicated how the operational dimensions
of such an institutional technology conceived by the EU Commission have been applied in
diﬀerent ways in each national and regional context. Here, several factors were relevant in
determining national and regional patterns, among which we can mention: (a) the divul-
gated examples and the supported narratives; (b) the selective attitude toward speciﬁc
policy arenas, e.g. through the organization of dialogue among policy communities; (c)
the selection modality of the LAG and the administrative process; and (d) the privileged
territorial focus (e.g. urban areas vs. rural sub- regions) in connection with the ESI Funds
allocation. These factors that were deployed diﬀerently in each country and region, mould-
ing a meta-governance frame that constrains the characteristics of the bottom up process
upon which the LAG and its spatial strategy are built.
Finally, a more structural question remains to be investigated: whether these initiat-
ives become eﬀective spatial–temporal ﬁxes that contribute to a soft process of re-articu-
lation of the state. The temporality of this spatially tailored initiative can, in the long
term, produce interesting institutional changes in the administration, or become cultu-
rally and institutionally-established territorial structures. The social construction and
the cultural adherence, more than the eﬃcacy of the strategy, are probably relevant
factors.
All these dimensions reveal variegated lines of compelling research agendas on the
extensive variety of local development initiatives taking place across Europe under the
institutional umbrella of the CLLD. At the same time, the interpretative scheme could
be challenged on other policy initiatives, to verify and to implement its analytical
validity.
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